Introduction: Labor Landscapes in Russia Today

As transnational corporations (TNCs) have appeared southeast of Moscow in Kaluga Region, particularly in the automotive industry and the plants supplying it, younger Russian workers are for the first time presented with a choice other than the risky informal economy or work in surviving factories from the Soviet era, most of which offer poor conditions and very low pay. However, workers in both the “new” high-tech, foreign-owned automotive assembly, and “old” low-tech “Soviet” production contexts articulate similar interpretive understandings of what makes work “precarious”—here understood as a sense of insecurity relating to degrees of alienation that workers experience in these different contexts. They respond to a general intensification of work associated with neoliberal transformation by stressing the “good” aspects of work associated with socialist-era labor “autonomy” and the “social wage” generally (in-kind enterprise benefits). A generalized and emic understanding of “bad,” insecure work has little to do with the literal precarity of work or poor pay. In both contexts insecurity of work tenure and poverty wages are widely understood as “normal”—and this is little changed since 1991. What really sets old and new work apart is the degree to which pace, intensity, and autonomy in task fulfillment are under the control of the worker, or at least subject to some kind of informal negotiation or mitigation through personalized production relations. While workers everywhere are subject to intensification, the loss of these socialist-era mitigations is most keenly felt by those in new TNCs. Many
Informants consider the old style of enterprise the “least worse” for those conditioned by the rhythms of the Soviet factory.¹

In this chapter we explore these understandings through in-depth interviews with workers in this sector and other industries locally. We document a divide between “entrepreneurial” workers who go to work for the car plants, and those who reject the labor relations model that it offers, contrasting it to a traditional “paternalistic” Russian model that remains the object of nostalgia, even as it has largely “decayed” into a purely symbolic form (Clarke 1995: 128). We do not interrogate the veracity of these interpretations but focus on how workers position themselves in Russian society as “losers” of global processes of transition and as the social group most exposed to precarity. These interpretations hold regardless of whether workers “stay” in traditional Russian industrial firms or “go” to TNCs. Overall precariousness has subjective as well as objective facets (International Labour Office 2012: 5). Both structural and perceived insecurities often hinge on the extension of new forms of labor discipline to securely and formally employed persons (Bourdieu 1998). Precariousness is thus a relational category that fundamentally depends upon the definition of societal standards of normality (Castel and Dörre 2009: 17). In most Global North contexts, precarious work is understood as a generational erosion of the Fordist standard employment relationship (Rodgers 1989; Dörre 2010; Brinkmann et al. 2006: 17). Precariousness means “return of social insecurity” (Castel 2011), and the expansion of the precariat is driven by financial capitalism (Dörre 2009).

For most industrial workers in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the socialist period was generally marked by secure, formalized jobs and an extensive system of social benefits for workers and their families that implicitly compensated for often poor working conditions and the lack of political representation (Cook 1993; Kotkin 1995). A hybrid form of flexibility between Fordism and individual craftwork emerged in many industrial contexts. The Soviet Union’s adoption of Taylorist/Fordist production techniques was less than successful (Wren 1980; Van Atta 1986). Production bottlenecks and the bureaucratic institutions of socialism allowed for a considerable degree of self-management on the shop floor in “unit clusters” of autonomous task fulfillment (Prokhorov 2002: 49–72). Comparing the relative alienation of workers under postwar capitalism and socialism, Chris Hann (2006: 105–107) points to the significance of consumption in the West. Whereas Fordism contributed to the stability of the capitalist social order by creating “satisfied” consumers at the expense of “satisfied” workers, the legitimacy of the socialist system rested on a more general social contract—a sense of security not tied to consumption norms resulting from labor (the ability to consume production), but tightly
connected to security *in* labor, and certain basic social guarantees. As a consequence, understandings of security and its lack—precarity—remain infused with particular mnemonic resources of class position as propagated in the socialist era, even if these may be, in part, “false” memories (Morris 2014a).

The scope of the paternalistic-bureaucratic system of central planning occasionally extended to severe disciplinary practices of “worker optimization,” but insecurity was rare and persistent unemployment unknown. Since the onset of post-Soviet market deregulation, by contrast, standard employment has been continually eroded and replaced by growing underemployment, sporadic wage arrears, increasing numbers of informal and semi-formal jobs, less secure jobs, the lack of legal development of workers’ social rights, wage arbitrariness, and a steep decline in social benefits (Hauslohner 1987; Clarke 1995; Stenning et al. 2010). Thus in Russia too, “precarity is everywhere” (Bourdieu 1998). But the response of workers to the new positioning of labor and production regimes in the global economy varies depending on workers’ inherited norms and prior experiences of socially embedded work.

**Methods and Fieldsites**

This chapter comprises materials collected in two distinct modes of research. Jeremy Morris has conducted long-term ethnographic fieldwork with blue-collar workers in an ex-monotown near Kaluga about an hour’s drive from the regional capital, site of the new TNC car plant. About 15,000 people live in Izluchino, an urban space that developed as the result of a “town-forming enterprise” in the postwar era. Local manufacturing includes aggregate extraction and processing (into bricks, lime, powders, and other construction materials), steel, and plastic fabrication (including tubing and cables for the domestic plumbing market and extractive gas industry). In addition, Izluchino has a linoleum rolling mill (foreign owned), small-scale manufacture of industrial filters, plastic window production shops, and a small rolling-stock repair workshop. The extractive and steel/plastic processes date from the Soviet period, as do the gravel aggregates. The other, post-USSR processes developed out of the extractive economic base. We refer to all enterprises that existed as of the Soviet period or early 1990s as “inheritors” of plant, personnel, and production “culture.” Many of those laid off in the 1990s never returned to blue-collar work—they either died off in the massive demographic collapse, survived on meager pensions, or disappeared into the informal economy, typically driving unregistered cabs, working on construction sites in Moscow, or engaging in petty trades. Since 2010 some younger
workers have started to commute from this town to the Frunzensky automotive plant and two other TNCs based in Kaluga. The chapter also draws on semi-structured interviews with union representatives and activists, mainly conducted by Sarah Hinz in 2013. Starting with gatekeepers working in blue-collar work in and near Kaluga city, we have established a group of key informants that includes union activists, “ordinary” assembly workers, and ex-workers.

Izluchino is set amidst a sea of surface quarries (most still exploitable) and is officially an “ex-monotown,” as it is no longer dominated by a single employer. Survivor production shops have disaggregated from the original plant, which was affiliated to a single powerful ministry. In the 1950s, when this ministry needed raw materials for vast military building projects throughout European Russia, the town was set to work. A few individually owned wooden houses, rebuilt after World War II, were surrounded by wooden barrack-houses for the new workers. New quarries were opened up. As lime kilns poured out their smoke, the skyline of the industrial zone filled with chimneys. After the 1960s, machine factories under the ministry also arrived, and Izluchino grew rapidly right up to the end of the Soviet period, as evidenced by the gradual change in housing stock as one moves away from the river’s edge: wooden houses from the 1940s, then 1950s wooden barracks, the low-rise panel buildings of the 1960s and 1970s, and finally, at the edge of the forest, the “best” five-story flats, built from brick in the 1980s and spacious by Soviet standards. The settlement functioned as the fiefdom of a single state employer. The “one-company city” gave the enterprise an exceptionally important role in the provision of para-state systems of welfare and patronage. Housing was built and maintained by the factory organization, and leisure, health, and other amenities were partly funded from the same source (Alexander and Buchli 2007). Many monotown enterprises acted almost as “total social institutions” and “states within states” (Clarke 1993: 26). The economy of the town was ‘the nexus of need fulfillment’ (Collier 2011: 83).

After the collapse of the USSR, the need for the quarries’ raw material diminished rapidly. Like many other Russian towns, Izluchino suffered significant loss of employment and services in the 1990s. Nonetheless, a number of successor employers and inheritor firms employ around 3,000 people in extractive industry. After 1998, following a major devaluation of the currency and the beginning of a building boom in Moscow, the town recovered economically. Before turning to the present situation, it is important for our argument to appreciate the nature of work on the shop floor and the social wage in the socialist past.
Soviet Industrial Work Remembered

Three themes emerge strongly from conversations with workers old enough to have experienced life in Izluchino’s factories and quarries in socialist days: labor mobility, personalized and flexible shop-floor relations, and the social wage. Although the inhabitants of Izluchino have a palpable sense of their “rootlessness,” as many were born elsewhere, they simultaneously express feelings of placeness, if not local patriotism. In the 1970s migrants from neighboring regions and further afield were attracted to the town’s well-paid industrial blue-collar jobs. As the housing queue was relatively short in this privileged location, men and women started families, many relatively large by Soviet Russian standards (three children). Izluchino bore witness to the high level of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian interregional labor mobility (Clarke 1999 and White 2007, both in Walker 2010: 649). As the director of the surviving factory Steelpipe recalls:

Izluchino was just Sredmash [an acronym for the industrial-defense complex tasked with ensuring a supply of fissile material] and the gravel pits. The mechanical factories were just a few particular cogs in the machinery of the ministry—the ministry had one aim: turning nuclear fissile material into warheads and pointing them at the West. But that aim was a million miles away from us here. We were a state within a state within a state. Each responsible for sourcing its own material and delivering it. The Sredmash director here was Tsar, or at least it was his personal fiefdom. The ministry had its own building directorate which alone built complexes for the military—the town-forming concern worked like a pump, churning out the material for that. It also sucked up labor from surrounding regions.

The almost universal experience of labor migration in the past continues to characterize people’s understanding of precarity and their response to it. Blue-collar workers in Izluchino occupied a particularly privileged space in the Soviet labor hierarchy, and memories of labor conditions idealize the past accordingly. They must be interpreted alongside other observations about state-labor compacts in the Soviet period. Practices of incentive and discipline in Soviet factories were “personalized” (Morrison 2008: 135; cf. Collier 2011: 106) but not “individualized.” Negotiations and bargaining on issues that materially affected workers, such as bonuses, piecework rates (only “loosely” set in late Soviet times) or overtime allowed brigade leaders and managers to exercise a large degree of discretion (Van Atta 1986; Morrison 2008: 139) based on personal relations of favor and “prestige” (avtoritet) within teams, rather than management’s assessment of an individual’s output or objective measures of value (Morris 2012a). This was largely due to the high ineffectuality of trade
union organization: unions were effectively a part of management and did not engage in promoting the interests of workers. Many unions of this type remain embedded in the management of Russian firms, relegated to the role of distributing minor social benefits. In some contexts, including the car industry, they are subject to increasing competition from “free” unions, as we discuss below.

One unintended outcome of discretion and other production issues was the high degree of autonomy practiced among work teams on the shop floor (Alasheev 1995; cf. Burawoy 1992). Aleksandr Prokhorov (2002: 155) identified a strong form of “grassroots solidarity” where management is at the mercy of workers who are united in feelings of alienation and subordination. Workers, it was said, were often willing to cover for each other within a team and were not subject to the surveillance and subordinating imperatives of today’s workplace. At least, this is the dominant narrative of workers in Izluchino two decades after this system’s disintegration.

Middle-aged and older Izluchino workers speak nostalgically about team-level solidarity in Soviet days. Solidarity here does not mean a sense of standing together in opposing exploitation (they often quip that state socialism and capitalism are equally exploitative; see Burawoy 1992). Rather, workers feel that the labor relations in the late Soviet period enabled them to develop a particular kind of work- and skill-based respect among other workers and management. This avtoritet (authority or prestige) was the basis of a personhood in which their labor was valued both for its own sake and socially (Morris 2012a). Workers associate their avtoritet with monetary and in-kind rewards from the enterprise, and with dignity in labor. As a feeder to the high-priority defense sector and a “closed” town, Izluchino remunerated its workers relatively well, not in terms of wages or easy working conditions but with provisions and other benefits. Blue-collar work was a route to social mobility and to “security ... education, training, childcare, housing, recreation and leisure, health facilities, retail and consumption, and heating and energy” (Stenning et al. 2010: 86; see also Kesküla 2014: 62). This “social wage”—social amenities in kind linked to employment—was fundamental to an implicit social contract (Smith et al. 2008: 288). The solidaristic community noted above was a further intangible component of this social wage. Thus Izluchino workers recall being able to articulate rights and expectations of certain benefits, even in person to the director of the enterprise, known to everyone by his first name and patronymic (see Collier 2011: 107). Younger male workers, the main focus of our research, access these narratives through parents and older peers.
Laboring Personhoods after 1991

The period 1993–1998, when most of the newly privatized and disaggregated inheritor businesses became insolvent, is perceived as one of crisis. Izluchino’s main enterprise was split up in 1998, and for a time everyone suffered real privations. However, the town showed resilience, and major losses in core employment are understood not only as displacements and “dislocations” (Burawoy, Krotov, and Lytkina 2000: 61) but also as shifts in patterns of employment and labor. People made do with their garden plots and petty trade, and by simply not engaging with the emerging consumer economy. From the late 1980s, the inheritor businesses, sometimes technically insolvent for over five years at a time, slowly but surely shed four thousand jobs before the 1998 financial crisis and default ushered in a turnaround, at least of sorts (Clarke 2007: 61–63). The devaluation of the ruble led to some respite for domestic industry, so that 1998 is the local mnemonic marker for the return to hiring. The smaller enterprises were bought out by managers or taken over by Moscow concerns.

In the early 2000s a number of pioneering multinational corporations—brewers, confectioners, and others—came to Kaluga Region because of its good transport links to Moscow, lower production costs, and geographical proximity to Europe. In 2012 the “border” with Moscow city suddenly became closer still when a large corridor along the Moscow-Kiev highway was incorporated into the city (having formerly belonged to Moscow Region). Kaluga Region now borders Moscow. A sizeable cohort of workers had exploited opportunities in informal construction work in Moscow after 1991. From the mid 2000s, however, the TNCs now present in the region created very different employment opportunities that, though outside the immediate vicinity of the town, were still much closer than Moscow—just an hour’s drive away, on the outskirts of Kaluga city. Younger workers were thus presented with an alternative to local employment or informal work in construction. The TNC vehicle factories offered better pay, but besides the long commute the jobs also entailed new, untested models of shop-floor relations.

Scholars of neoliberal production regimes in Russia have emphasized that a trend of increased control over workers, intensification of the work burden, and a general tightening of the workday’s regime (or timetable) has resulted in a loss of autonomy, reflected in increasing monitoring of how workers complete tasks (Kagarlitsky 2008; Levinson 2007). Both younger and older workers in Izluchino, including those who stayed the course with the TNC conveyor work assembling automobiles and those who quit, support those findings (Morris 2012a). Simon Clarke (2007)
Jeremy Morris and Sarah Hinz has argued that the subordination of production to the new law of value has caused line managers to change from patriarchal representatives of collectives (the traditional Soviet role) into agents of management. The enterprise social wage has been reduced to a symbolic level, even as state welfare provision has retreated. In addition, job opportunities were no longer “inheritable” through personal connections of relatives at the plant as they had been in the socialist period, so this sense of a secure pathway for youth has also disappeared. Though “connections” (blat) are important in well-paid white-collar jobs, this kind of hiring process is less common in industrial work.

Those who continue to work for plastic, steel, or extraction enterprises in the town complain about changes in production relations and diminishing social protection. Nonetheless, traditional roles and “echoes” of the perceived social benefits of Soviet shop-floor relations persist in these workplaces (Morris 2016). Thus the meanings of “precarious work” are inflected by place and the (sometimes idealized) past. Blue-collar workers understand bad work in terms of specific micro-processes of labor: a lack of autonomy in task solving, flexibility in time management, unmediated oversight by the managers—all symptoms of intensification processes. Thus when workers complain about bad jobs and understand the new position of their labor as insecure, marginalized, and inequitable, they tell a wider story about the expansion of capitalist relations into the “hidden abode of production”—particularly considering that throughout the postsocialist economic transformation, many scholars observed the stubborn persistence of a Soviet shop-floor culture where paternalism, personalized relations, worker autonomy, and flexible use of the workday continue.

New Blood at the Car Plant

It is 2010, and a new cohort of workers has just been taken on at Frunzensky and other car plants near Kaluga as production of cars for the domestic market ramps up. This intake includes Slava, who at twenty-four is leaving a blue-collar job in town to commute to the TNC and make mid-priced cars for the Russian market. In our first few encounters, Slava and his future wife are very guarded. Perhaps they are worried about envy; after all, Slava now has a prestigious, relatively well-paid blue-collar job. But jealousy could hardly be over money alone. After a relatively lengthy probationary period, Slava earns no more than 18,000 rubles (800 US dollars) a month, while his former mates at the old-style factories earn around 14,000 rubles (470 dollars). Later, after union action in 2012 raises the wages of car plant
workers to significantly higher levels than those paid in Izluchino, they are still not much higher than the Kaluga city average for blue-collar work.

Slava was previously a core member of a dense social network of male workers, many of them former school friends with whom he worked at a cement factory as well as in the informal economy in an unlicensed (i.e., unregistered for tax and insurance) enterprise making plastic window frames. For him and his best friend Petr, the new plant had presented an opportunity for stabler conditions and the hope of higher wages in the long term. It was an exciting, if hazy, “prospect.” For both young men, the perceived flexibility, autonomy, and paternalism of the inheritor enterprises did not mitigate the risk that they would soon go out of business. They saw the TNC as holding the possibility of entry into a kind of aristocracy of labor that would offer them long-term social mobility.

Slava’s initial job status as an external “agency” worker at Frunzensky puts him on a waiting list. Numerous hoops have to be jumped through before there can be any hope of transfer to permanent worker status with legal rights, benefits, and pay. Sickness time off is one such issue to overcome, particularly as Slava’s wife gave birth a year after he started there. When the child was sick Slava felt pressure to care for the child at home, as his wife also worked. Meanwhile, one has to have the “right attitude” and get in with the “right” people to make sure one’s name progresses up the list toward the coveted status of permanent employment instead of agency worker. Other workers underline the “harsh physical demands.” Here a lack of “flexibility” and intensification are linked in workers’ minds. Unlike in local Russian companies, where moves toward intensification were gradual and the history of flexible working is long, there is no conception of “optimization” of labor, by which informants mean that a person who is unable to cope with the conveyor work (including heavy labor lifting car parts) can be redeployed in a different part of plant. The attitude at the TNCs is that weaker workers are “disposable.”

With this knowledge, it is easy to see why Slava is guarded. Even in a friendly group, the sense of “getting above one’s station” is keenly felt. In 2014, after Petr too has been working at the car plant for a few years, he says of another friend, Nikita, who has no overt ambitions to try work at Frunzensky: “He has to work, but doesn’t know why, certainly not towards a directed aim. That’s just the way he is and he is happy with himself. Nikita just has to spend all his pay even before he gets it.” This comes in response to Slava talking about feeling “trapped” by his well-paid conveyor job at Frunzensky (having taken on a mortgage and started to climb the career ladder). But it is almost as if now, with the benefit of hindsight, Petr (the other conveyor worker) and Slava have some secret admiration, as much as scorn, for their friend Nikita’s “easy-come-easy-go” attitude. And this
is related to Slava’s (and to a lesser extent Petr’s) anxiety in talking about the car plant work. The feeling of being trapped by the work at the TNC results from prior expectations of a significantly better working environment with the ability to earn more in the long term. These expectations are not met, and after a short “honeymoon” period most workers feel significant disillusionment.

Such disillusionment results in labor turnover at the plant that is high even by Russian standards and a source of some embarrassment for the firm. Slava’s entry into the plant coincided with a remarkable period of new, “free” trade union activity, itself spurred on by this general feeling of dissatisfaction with conditions and pay at the plant. The union sees this high turnover (Russian tekuchka, churning) as evidence that the plant was fertile ground for labor agitation, and the activists’ hunch proved to be correct. Along with “standard” issues such increasing pay and reducing hours, they see the issue of agency workers’ status and rights as a key element of their militancy.

Approximately 12 percent of the workforce—about 540 people—are agency workers. The plant uses agency work explicitly as a recruiting method—the most loyal workers have a realistic chance of being “transferred” to permanent staff. Agency workers are paid at least 13 percent less than permanent staff and do not have access to benefits like enhanced medical insurance and long, paid vacations. As churn is also quite high among the permanent personnel, the Frunzensky management can immediately compensate by replacing the vacant position with a suitable worker from the extensive pool of agency workers already employed, instead of having to turn to the labor market. This is how Slava and Petr, luckily, will find themselves permanent contracts. They will also benefit from the union’s successful fight in the other areas, for in 2013 the union will sign a collective bargaining agreement with management—the firm’s acknowledgement of the union’s success and its dislocation of the “traditional” Soviet-style union also operating at the plant.

Another factor contributing to workers’ anxiety is the absolute novelty of foreign employers, managers, and relatively high-tech production lines. The car plants symbolize the shock to the individual in these new times, as productivity demands are imposed on Russian workers used to Soviet-style production regimes and practices. Coupled with more general cultural differences, Slava and Petr feel perpetually tested by the new plant and therefore reluctant to discuss it, even with close friends. After taking a risk as great as that taken by those who escape into the informal economy, what if those going to work for the foreigners come back as failures?

Along with an ongoing sense of novelty, strangeness, and the sense of being tested is the endemic suspicion and distrust of all things foreign
among the Russian men, young and old alike. The influence of the closed Soviet society and the experience of growing up in the semi-closed defense ministry town live on. The watchfulness appears mutual. The first chink in Slava’s armor was his surprise at the cultural difference of management. Instead of shouting and swearing, the foreign supervisors were always calm, if insistent and demanding. The usual stereotype of Russian inscrutability was reversed and projected onto the Germans and others (such as Slovak lower-level supervisors). Working for and with foreigners was a major milestone, not only in Slava’s working life, but also in terms of his and his family’s life experience. It was “weird” in a way he struggled to articulate, but given the former status of Izluchino, not difficult to understand. Added to this was the sense that this shiny and relatively promising work might disappear as soon as it had magically arrived. Given the sense of generalized insecurity in the labor market that has become part of the “normal” backdrop of workers’ lives since 1991, workers have learned wariness, patience, and above all cynicism. This also added to Slava’s and Petr’s reticence. ‘Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth’ is a Russian saying too.

Slava soon admits that one reason for his wariness is the overly formal way that his work contract has been set up: even as a probationer he had to sign an agreement not to disclose to third parties any business practices at the plant. He takes this seriously when being questioned by a foreign researcher. Also, for the first year or so, Slava’s pay is not very much higher than that in the town, therefore he feels it is imprudent to talk too much about the work, given the possibility that the “risk” he has taken will turn out to be “not worth it.” Just as elsewhere—in the local, “old style” factories in Izluchino, a significant proportion of salary is paid as a “bonus.” But in contrast to his previous experience in the town in “Soviet-style” factories, the supervisors at the car plant, whether Russian or foreign, have no qualms about withholding or “fining” workers’ bonuses for what would be considered relatively minor infractions elsewhere.

In another conversation, Slava and others discuss the lack of self-realization and satisfaction in work. There is little specialized work on the shop floor, so highly qualified workers are not needed. Those like Slava who are able to compare the more traditional working environment in the town with the Kaluga assembly line’s repetitive, monotonous tasks day in and day out, explain that many workers quit because they have the feeling there is no way out. The paucity of possibilities for “ordinary” workers to develop themselves in the workplace is mirrored in the low level of the wages at the plant—between 26,000 and 40,000 rubles (in 2013, 800–1250 US dollars)—and good workers reach the higher end of the scale after only a couple of years. This means that human capital is not bound to the plant. Naturally,
this is an issue for both the independent union at the plant and individuals, despite considerable successes in collective bargaining that have already been achieved through struggles and negotiations with management. The plant has a very high market share, and although the wage at AvtoVAZ (the “standard” Russian car plant making the lion’s share of domestic autos) is about 2.5 times lower than that at Frunzensky, the latter is only a little higher than the average wage paid in the Kaluga region. For the union and many workers, the calculation is simple: if Ford near St. Petersburg is able to pay more—up to twice as much as Frunzensky—why can’t Frunzensky do the same? But for Frunzensky management, the slogan seems to be: Why pay more when you can pay less? It was the union that drew attention to these disparities, but such comparisons are an effective articulation of general disillusionment after the initial period of employment for many workers. Their articulations follow an arc of growing self-realization about the positioning of their labor in this new context.

Even more of an issue in terms of disillusionment, and sometimes of explicit comparison to more traditional production relations, is the shift system at the car plant and the lack of spare time for workers that comes with it. Working long hours and weekends is less an exception than an actual rule. Added to this is the long commute many make from outlying areas. Because of these time constraints, a place at the plant precludes the secondary employment and informal work that are extremely common and often lucrative for other blue-collar workers in Russia, including those in the “old” plants in Izluchino. So depending on an employer with an all-consuming job that leaves neither enough spare time to recover from long shifts nor sufficient time for a further informal job, adds to the perceived insecurity of many workers at the plant. Anxiety is also heightened by the disparity in production relations between the foreign plant and the inheritor businesses like the cement and steel pipe enterprises in the town. Petr and Slava were experiencing coercion in a completely “new” and unnerving way. They are fundamentally disturbed by the “indirect” nature of the more Taylorist, compartmentalized, highly organized production regime. This takes time to get used to, and with time Slava and Petr become able to articulate more and more of what they feel is “weird,” for instance, the conspicuous absence at the European and Asian plants of normal Russian management practices: minimal oversight, lack of forward planning, and a lot of slack followed by “storming” to meet deadlines, with a bonus for the whole team at the end regardless of quality. At Frunzensky the benchmark is global competitiveness, but Russian car producers are less subject to pressure to maximize profits because the Russian government subsidizes them, supporting a key employment sector. As Slava sheepishly admits, “they really know how to get every ounce out of you all the time, every
day, from the start to the end of the shift.” It turned out, as his soon-to-be-wife Marina articulates, that “he’s not trying to avoid talking about the conveyor; he’s just completely exhausted!” A fit young man of twenty-four, Slava collapses into bed at home after his shift and falls asleep in front of the television.

It is a long time before I see Slava again. It seems he has disappeared from the social group entirely. But at the end of summer, all the car plants have a furlough period when they retool. In late August 2012, Slava and his wife, along with Petr and others, have a barbeque at a village plot outside town. By this time, Petr too works for Frunzensky, having become a permanent worker after a period as an agency contractor. This social occasion is where Slava’s feeling of being hemmed in really comes to the fore. Slava has been promoted to foreman on the conveyor, and the independent trade union, after instigating industrial action at the plant and in supplier plants, has signed a collective wage agreement resulting in better wages and conditions. Yet Slava looks ever more like a haunted man. As the women busy themselves putting children to bed and cleaning up after the meal, a group of men gather round the fire some distance away. Stumbling over his words, and with a pained look into the fire, Slava keeps talking—somewhat in awe—of the mortgage he has taken out on a new-build Kaluga flat and his new, “physical” realization that he is now “tied” to the foreman’s job permanently. Petr, just a conveyor worker but also destined for a more specialized role, uses the word “trap,” but leaves it unclear whether he is referring to the mortgage or to the higher-paid foreman’s role, although arguably they are connected.

Slava continues: “It’s difficult to swallow. I took on the foreman’s job, but I just can’t really push people around like I am supposed to. I needed the promotion to get the mortgage—Marina isn’t working while the kid is small. But now, it’s kind of like I am surprised that I can’t give it up.”

Shortly afterward, Slava and his family leave the village for their long journey home, leaving Nikita and Petr to ponder on their friend’s predicament. While Petr is sympathetic, he criticizes Slava’s choice of taking on a burdensome mortgage so soon. Petr himself had saved up for years to buy a very modest local apartment before taking the “risk” of working for Frunzensky. Nikita is visibly angry at Petr’s balanced and calculating response:

You clearly didn’t see the weld burns on Slava’s arms and face. Everyone’s talking about how poor the conditions really are at the plant. No better than anywhere else in reality. And yes, I was tempted by the extra 5-10k pay a month, but then there is the commute. You look tired yourself, mate. How long do you spend on the road behind the wheel of your Lada?
Nikita cannot let it lie, and the following exchange results:

Nikita: Ok, the lad will have a flat in Kaluga. And a discount or credit on a Škoda that will fall apart on our roads. So fucking what? To break his back for the “new deal” at the plant that they only won after the strikes? Physically that job, despite the shiny German plant and showers and clean overalls, is no different from mine at the Cement. And we have showers too you know. And there’s no sitting around or smoking in the back there. That’s the only plant that’ll sack you for coming in smelling of booze too!

Petr: Well, that would be you out on your ear after the second shift, then [good-naturedly laughing!]! At the end of the day, I still don’t know yet whether it was worth buying my flat here or in Kaluga. Both are extortionate. The prices are almost like Moscow. That’s the problem. If you live with your mum then the pay is amazing. If you have responsibilities it is no different from the Cement.

You are right about the physicality. I’ve been off sick for most of August due to my back. And the travel time, well, yes, that’s dead time regardless of whether you are in your own car or the works bus—the cost of which they take out of your pay, by the way.

Clearly, Nikita’s talk is significantly inflected by resentment, possibly envy, and some second-hand, if not inaccurate, information about conditions at the plant. On the other hand, his practical reasoning about the risks associated with work at Frunzensky and other plants is firmly shared by many others. Petr’s considered position frankly acknowledges some of Nikita’s points. In fact, as time goes on, Petr’s pre-existing health problems get worse at the plant, necessitating long and involved medical intervention. Petr’s “worth” to Frunzensky does not amount to his employer paying for the necessary medical care beyond the absolute legal minimum—whereas in the “old” factories, rightly or wrongly, a more paternalist attitude (including personalized treatment by management) is perceived to still prevail.

Locally in Izluchino, the arrival of the car plants and other enterprise facilities is a major source of bitterness, because it is the best and youngest workers who are most likely to leave the town’s struggling enterprises. The anxieties Slava expresses about his new work are replicated by local businesses: it is all some trick, a sleight of hand by the regional governor to please Putin. The Germans, French, Swedes, and Japanese will suck out what marrow is left here and then relocate back to their homelands. “We’re the blacks of Europe alright,” says one worker. “Do you know how much the Slovak Frunzensky workers building the cars in Bratislava get paid? Twice as much as even our specialist workers! Are they any more productive? Of course not!” This is not accurate—Slovak workers’ wages are perhaps 30
per cent higher—however, the Slovakian cost of living may well be lower due to the higher cost of food in Russia.

While many locals are genuinely concerned for their town because of the competition for labor, many more articulate politically aware cynicism about the companies and their government. They talk of Kaluga becoming a low-wage global outsourcing site of blue-collar labor. Now that the “honeymoon” period of workers like Slava at the plants is over, people are not surprised by the labor turnover in the foreign plants and their workers’ militancy, which is supposed to be even stronger than it is in the Russian and “Soviet” plants.

Two related articulations of dissatisfaction are noteworthy. First, even relatively young workers often cannot reconcile themselves to the increasing imperatives to “self-exploit.” This term denotes the coercion of labor regimes that “produce” the entrepreneurial individual in a way that appears to relate to intrinsic motivation, but is actually an effect of the biopolitics at the heart of neoliberal intensification and disciplining regimes (Hamann 2009). The blue-collar work at the car plants that exemplifies this regime is rejected by those in the informal economy and those who opt to stay in “old” factories with slower, more predictable rhythms, even if here too postsocialist dispossession is acutely felt. The search for alternative autonomist values can be observed in different global contexts very different from that in Russia (Skeggs 2011; De Neve 2014). However, even those who develop more enterprising selves, like Slava and Petr, articulate frustration at the lack of autonomy in regulating their own pace and approach to solving tasks and meeting production targets. Second, locals are aware of the “offshoring” and state-within-a-state nature of many of the industrial parks, one of which is dominated by Frunzensky and its most important suppliers. In some ways they ironically resemble “closed” factory towns of the Soviet period like Izluchino: gated entry; only works buses allowed in and out; significant monitoring and searching of staff entering and leaving (workplace theft was immediately a problem at Frunzensky); heightened labor discipline (e.g., concerning alcohol use). In comparison, old-style factories are more lenient, as they want to keep the workers they have and are willing to overlook some absences as long as the individual has skills in demand.

Those of a more reflective nature go further: aren’t these little fiefdoms of Germany, France, and Japan, like colonies in the third world? Extracting surplus value to be shipped back home? “And we’re not even up to the standard of Brazil!” said another worker. “They even get better pay in the Anchieta factory that makes saloon cars near Sao Paolo.” Multiple generations of Marxist-Leninist education have not gone entirely to waste—even the less educated can readily connect the dots to spell “exploitation” and
“proletariat.” The resulting problem of labor churn (*tekuchka*) is bemoaned by entrepreneurs at every turn, and it is especially bad at Frunzensky. A candid, relatively balanced local news report highlights this after a third shift is taken on and union activity increases in response to the large numbers of agency contract workers. A human resources manager comments:

I have never seen such churning of labor as in that factory. Since I arrived we’ve lost 600 workers in six months. And of these around 60% left of their own accord. The ones forced to leave were due to infractions of labor discipline, alcohol. At first I was surprised but now I get it. Many people who come to work from the edges of Kaluga and worked previously in agriculture or construction. Many were unaccustomed to work in three shifts and on the conveyor. Therefore the majority of those quitting left in the first two months. (Gusev 2011)

Although the foreign HR manager’s account is partial (his reference to the lack of worker experience in factory work is disingenuous at best), it is revealing of the problems of churn and their rootedness in differing cultural and moral norms of production. A more polemical piece entitled “The Path of the Blue-Collars” appears in the national business weekly magazine *Expert* that year (Rytsareva 2011). Its main message is the familiar line that Russians are unsuited to the disciplined demands of the “shiny” globalized factory. The journalist, who has found “sad-faced,” downtrodden workers there, implied that they are ungrateful for the opportunity the benevolent foreigners have provided in this provincial city. The author bemoans the lack of technical preparation of young people in the vocational education sector as well as the inability of Russian firms to act as suppliers to the factory. Nowhere does the author address the issue of labor turnover. Interestingly, a representative of the International Metalworkers’ Federation associated with the local independent union at the Kaluga plant takes the time to respond substantively to the article: “I don’t really get this position: creatively describing the glum, gloomy people without even trying to find out what is actually happening at their workplace.” After describing some issues with safety at the plant that the union has highlighted (including the burns Slava suffered), the metalworkers’ representative continues:

So, the main problem is as always, the [quality of the] “people”? ... I will make no mention of the fact that the huge pay of the workers (about 20,000 rubles) is lower than the average for Kaluga Region in large and medium sized enterprises. That’s not the problem, the people are. How many times can the liberal cliche of undisciplined Russian workers be repeated at the same time as refusing to even ask about how things are at the factory? (Matveev 2011)

The undeniable fact of relatively uncompetitive, or, as informants sometimes say, “stingy” wages, especially when deductions for work clothes,
transport, and canteens are taken into account, no doubt adds to workers’ attraction to the new union at the car plants. Slava and Petr have not joined the union yet but have benefited from its work. Their paternalistic expectations of a union echo the older generation’s understanding of industrial relations and are a source of frustration to the new union. Elsewhere we tell the story of union activism at the plant (Morris and Hinz 2016), which is beyond the scope of this chapter. A major issue for unions trying to gain critical mass at plants is the problem of the “free rider,” represented here by our informants. Slava and Petr are wary of the union, but grudgingly acknowledge its effectiveness, despite only around 20 percent of the workforce being members at any one time. In a sense they exhibit a neoliberal entrepreneurialism of self that is different from that of their peers who reject work in the factory (cf. Morris 2012a).

Concluding Remarks

To grasp the transformative power of neoliberalism, it is essential to investigate how workers “understand, reflect, and act collectively upon subordination to increasingly precarious positions” within a global economy (Krinsky 2007: 344), even if they remain in a “normative” model of permanent employment. Precarity in Russian industrial work is less about job insecurity, although even for permanent plant workers the threat of dismissal—for not keeping up the pace, for disciplinary infractions, or simply because of the geopolitical risks of global business in Russia—is real. The objective evaluation of what is “bad” versus “good” work is tied to a sense of what a proper person qua worker should be—as are dreams of elevation into an increasingly unreachable labor aristocracy and fears of descent into the reserve labor pool. This is indivisible from the sense of self- and objective “worth” and “value” developed in the socialist period. The sense of what makes the present precarious comes to take on a psycho-social articulation in classed personhood.

Any reading of the impact of neoliberalism on workers in Russia must take account of past narratives of labor that continue to influence contemporary lived experience. We must be careful not to construct a one-dimensional perspective of workers as merely passive in their reception of global processes and reshappings of space, and instead seek to reveal more nuanced and differentiated meanings and narratives of work, and the negotiation of work relationships under post-socialism (Crowley and Ost 2001).

The meaning of precarious work in the Global North remains firmly anchored to workers’ fears about loss of permanent work and underemployment (Kalleberg 2009: 7–8). It is essentially related to the post-Fordist
period since the 1970s in the West, which is problematic to transplant to other contexts (Munck 2013). Workers in Russia may not be frightened of losing “bad” jobs, as there is no shortage of alternatives in both traditional factories and the informal economy.

This chapter ends with the contradictory yet resolutely moral perspectives of the main informants as, to different degrees, they make efforts to “adapt” to the ever changing demands of production in the globalized labor market of Kaluga Region. The differences between those who go to the car plant and others who stubbornly resist the chance to earn better wages there cannot be explained easily by any one factor. But one thing is clear: informants unambiguously interpret TNC conveyor work and other such jobs as a kind of metastasis of processes of intensification in, and alienation of, labor—processes that are emblematic of what makes jobs “bad” and work life “precarious.”

Meanwhile, some workers (like Petr in his labor at Frunzensky), who equally well articulate the sense of unfair exploitation and inadequate remuneration, are nonetheless more accommodating, more accepting of their lot. In the most positive light, such a life strategy can be seen as striving for betterment, for mobility, for the long-term sustainability of his household. Certainly that is the moral justification that is internalized. But it remains to be seen how sustainable such a position is, given ongoing health and other “contingent” risks to these workers. In 2014, as the economic downturn intensified due to new international sanctions against Russia, Frunzensky experienced its third period of shutdown due to low demand. In the autumn and winter of that year, permanent workers lost nearly seven weeks of work but still received two-thirds pay during the stoppages.

This chapter has highlighted Russian workers’ particularistic interpretations of the positioning of their labor in the globalizing blue-collar work of Kaluga Region. These encompass subjective and objective understandings of a loss of autonomy in task completion, increased surveillance, and the erasure of a buffering of work relations by team structure. While these effects of the neoliberalization of work are felt in the surviving Russian industrial contexts in the town of Izluchino, they are even more keenly experienced in the Frunzensky TNC auto plant. There, even the compressed wage structure (largely beyond the scope of this chapter) is experienced as a symptom of work intensification. Even when the union won a significant increase in wages after 2012, a widespread interpretation in the plant and beyond held that such physically intensive work and monitoring meant that wages were not adequate compensation in comparison to lower-paid, less demanding blue-collar employment elsewhere.

People’s talk continually references the community-level memory of the socialist-era social contract and the perceived affordances of labor
prior to the present period. They refer especially to the loss, over the last quarter century, of the social wages and the modest autonomy and flexibility in work/shop-floor relations that once compensated for poor conditions and wages. Lastly, labor mobility remains a paradoxical element in workers’ response to insecurity. Large-scale mobility in the Soviet period gave the working class an opportunity to access real social mobility. At the same time, demand for labor led the socialist state to make concessions to workers in the form of a commitment to increase the social wage over time. This process broke down from the 1990s on. However, mobility—whether exercised by turning to even more precarious work in the local informal economy, or by taking up construction work, shuttle trading, or other activities further afield—was a key way in which blue-collar workers dealt with the postsocialist transition. Labor mobility in response to precarity has been a central object of study in labor economics of postsocialist transition generally (Friebel and Guriev 1999).

Albert Hirschman’s (1970) hermeneutic framework of responses to insecurity in organizations faced with crisis has been used elsewhere to analyze choices facing ordinary people after socialism, particularly as an apt metaphor for the “non”-choices facing workers during the 1990s transition (e.g., Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Sippola 2014). Stephen Crowley (2004) proposes “exit” into the informal economy for workers who have no “voice” (cf. Greskovits 1998; Morris 2016).

In the present, workers in turn are leaving informal work and local employment swayed by the promises of the TNC conveyor in the regional capital of Kaluga. However, labor turnover at the German plant is higher than in the surviving Russian businesses, and labor unrest is significant. It is no longer TNCs that confront postsocialist workers with the non-choice of accepting neoliberalized workspaces, but workers who increasingly confront the globalization of their labor through TNCs by questioning the value the companies ascribe to it. They do this by accessing enduring moral understandings about autonomy, reward, dignity in labor, and ultimately localized, socially embedded understandings of what “bad” and “worse” work is. This is apparent in their choices: sticking with the TNCs, retreating to the remaining Soviet-style enterprises, or taking a risk to pursue even more insecure work as taxi drivers, tradespersons, and seasonal construction workers in the informal economy (Morris 2012a, 2014b).

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informants were involved in the research, which focused particularly on four households. We owe many insights that improved this chapter to the editors and to Sarah Ashwin, who commented on an earlier version of the essay.

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**Notes**

1. While it is overly simplistic to contrast old Soviet-style firms with TNCs—both are subject to the imperatives of “streamlining” labor, extracting greater value, and intensifying production—we highlight the culture of production in TNCs in particular as emblematic of more general neoliberalizing processes. Though we are at pains to stress that remaining in “Soviet-style” production-scapes is no bed of roses, it does offer measurable affordances—be they economistic rational ones to do with use of free time (for earning money in the informal economy and self-provisioning) and access to family, tangible social benefits, or token psychological ones (Morris 2014b). Similarly, while ‘Soviet-style’ is a necessary simplification of the diversity of production-scapes, in terms of shopfloor cultures they resemble each other and this is important for worker’s interpretations of ‘bad’ and ‘less bad’ work. See Morris (2016).

2. Izluchino is a pseudonym. It is not officially a town, but an “urban settlement” (*poselek gorodskogo tipa*), reflecting its connection to rapid industrialization after World War II. Locally, the town is emblematic of the proliferation of small and medium-sized towns, a process that occurred throughout the Soviet Union. By the end of the Soviet period, nearly 30 percent of Russia’s population lived in industrial cities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants (Collier 2011:111).
3. A sense of belonging to the locality was sometimes expressed using the common phrase *malaia rodina*, or “little motherland.”

4. Clarke and Soulsby (1998: 36, in Stenning *et al.* 2010: 87) calculated that the social wage was worth up to 20 percent of the value of the money wage in industrial enterprises in 1980s Czechoslovakia. On the expansion of the social wage among workers and others in the period up to 1991 see Hauslohner (1987). For a broad comparison of case studies of changes to social wages in postsocialist countries see Rein, Friedman, and Wörgötter (1997); on the social wage as a mechanism of social control see Domaniński (1997).

5. For industrial contexts similar to Izluchino, Clarke identified several particularly relevant features of the period: the lag in salary increases, consolidation of ownership, a new impetus for hands-on management, and strong recovery for strategically located firms and those with flexibility in use of space and resources.

6. Informal refers here to work paid off the books, often seasonal and without any legal protection. See Morris (2014b) and Morris and Polese (2014).

7. It should be noted that the cars produced for the TNC in Russia are for the domestic market. However, this does not negate the point workers make about exploitation.

References


